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This paper establishes and interprets a necessary and sucient condition
for existence of (countably additive) correlated equilibrium in n-person games,
assuming only that utility functions are bounded, measurable. A sequence of
deviation proles is consistent if there exists a correlated strategy that makes
every prole in the sequence unprotable with respect to the sum of utilities.
An equilibrium exists if and only if every sequence of deviation proles has a
consistent subsequence. This condition fails to characterize Nash equilibrium.
As a direct corollary, existence of (communication) equilibrium is characterized
in games with incomplete information on type spaces large enough to include
the universal one. Exact conditions for existence of approximate correlated
equilibrium are also obtained, as well as a value for two-person zero-sum games.
JEL Classication: C61, C72.
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This paper provides necessary and sucient conditions for existence of both correlated
equilibrium and approximate equilibrium in general games, specically games with
measurable action spaces and bounded, measurable utility functions. Therefore, no
topological assumptions are required for existence of equilibrium. As corollaries,
existence of communication equilibrium in games with incomplete information on
large type spaces (including the universal one) as well as existence of a value for
zero-sum games are characterized.
Near consistency characterizes existence of approximate equilibrium (Theorem 1),
and sequential consistency characterizes equilibrium existence (Theorem 2). Near
consistency means that for every " > 0 and every prole of deviation plans by the
players, there exists a correlated strategy (not necessarily the same one) such that the
sum of players' unilateral deviation gains is less than ". Conversely, near consistency
fails if there exists " > 0 and a deviation prole such that for any correlated strategy,
some player i gains at least "=n. Sequential consistency means that every sequence
of deviation proles has a subsequence for which there is a correlated strategy that
makes the sum of deviation gains not positive along the subsequence. Neither near
consistency nor sequential consistency characterize Nash equilibrium.
This study builds on and extends the work of Hart and Schmeidler (1989) by study-
ing countably additive equilibria of discontinuous games. Hart and Schmeidler use
duality to prove existence of countably additive correlated equilibrium in games with
compact action spaces and continuous utility functions, as well as nitely additive
correlated equilibrium when utilities are just bounded, measurable. However, they
argue by example that nitely additive probabilities are undesirably unintuitive. This
note bridges the gap between their two results by nding necessary and sucient con-
ditions for existence of countably additive correlated equilibrium when utilities are not
necessarily continuous and action spaces are not necessarily compact.
The study of (countably additive) correlated equilibrium in discontinuous games has
not been explored much in the literature.1 However, the fact that correlated equi-
librium is dened by linear inequalities suggests that its existence may be easier to
analyze than that of Nash equilibrium. Moreover, existence of correlated equilibrium
is strictly more general than Nash equilibrium, as Example 1 below shows.
1Yannelis and Rustichini (1992) is an exception, but it focuses on (weakly) continuous games.
1Example 1. Consider the following three-player game without a Nash equilibrium
(in pure or mixed strategies) but where a correlated equilibrium exists.2 Player 1 has
two actions, A1 = fU;Dg. Player 2 also has two actions, A2 = fL;Rg. Player 3 has
innitely many actions, A3 = Z, with typical element z. Payos are depicted below.
L R L R L R
U 2, 2, 3 + 1=z 0, 0, 8 U 2, 2, 2 0, 0, 0 U 2, 2, 0 0, 0, 0
D 0, 0, 0 2, 2, 0 D 0, 0, 0 2, 2, 2 D 0, 0, 8 2, 2, 3   1=z
z < 0 z = 0 z > 0
Player 1 chooses a row, player 2 chooses a column, and player 3 chooses a matrix.
Thus, if players 1 and 2 choose (U;L) and player 3 chooses z =  4 then players 1
and 2 each get a payo of 2 and player 3 gets a payo of 2.75.
Notice rst of all that there is no Nash equilibrium in this game. Indeed, if there
were one then it would have to involve players 1 and 2 playing either (U;L), (D;R),
or each mixing independently with probability 1
2. However, it is easy to see that in
either case player 3 has no best response. On the other hand, there does exist a
correlated equilibrium, namely where players 1 and 2 perfectly correlate their play by
mixing with probability 1
2, say, between (U;L) and (D;R), and player 3 plays 0. It is
easy to see that no player has the incentive to deviate from this correlated strategy.
The question of existence of Nash equilibrium as been explored in depth, with many
partial answers (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Simon, 1987; Simon and Zame, 1990;
Reny, 1999; Athey, 2001). Most approaches tended to consider mixed Nash equilib-
rium as a special case of pure Nash. That is, they rst established sucient conditions
for existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and then reinterpreted them on the
space of mixed strategies.
The approach below relies on duality to squarely ask for existence of any equilibrium,
be it pure, mixed, or correlated. Technically, we apply Clark's (2006) extension of
Farkas' Lemma for innite-dimensional spaces to the incentive constraints dening
correlated equilibrium. This leads to a dual system of inequalities that is equivalent
to equilibrium, which lends itself to a strategic interpretation exploited below.
2Although Hart and Schmeidler (1989) provide an example without Nash equilibrium but with
correlated equilibrium, they rely on there being innitely many players, each with nitely many
strategies. Here, on the other hand, there are nitely many players, only one of which has innitely
many strategies. It is also possible to construct similar examples with only two players.
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and states
the main results. Section 3 discusses the model, interprets the results, and relates
them to the previous literature. Section 4 uses these results in games of incomplete
information, zero-sum games, and environments with transfers. Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A collects notation and preliminaries on duality in general spaces. Finally,
proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Model
In this section we dene our objects of study and state our main results. Specically,
we rst introduce the general environment of games with bounded measurable payos,
followed by denitions of correlated and approximate correlated equilibrium. Next, we
dene and interpret consistency, near-consistency and sequential consistency. Finally
the paper's main results are stated and discussed. The main results characterize
equilibrium and approximate equilibrium.
Let I = f1;:::;ng be a nite set of players. For every i 2 I, let (Ai;Ai) be a





be the product space of action proles, endowed with the product -algebra A. To
describe a game, every player is given a utility function over action proles.
Assumption 1. Every player i's utility function ui : A ! R is bounded, measurable.
This assumption is necessary for the all of the analysis below. Although imposing
measurability is not controversial (otherwise expected utility would be meaningless),
boundedness|admittedly|is.4 Nevertheless, let us conne ourselves to this other-
wise quite general environment.
Denition 1. A game with bounded measurable payos, or simply a game, is any
  = (I;A;u) that satises all of the above.
3We assume measurable action spaces to dene (mixed) correlated strategies and deviation plans.
4Boundedness is assumed to avoid indeterminacies like 1 1 when calculating deviation gains.
Although we may apply a monotone transformation to utilities in order to make them bounded, in
general this would lead to a dierent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility over lotteries.
32.1 Equilibrium and Approximate Equilibrium
Next, let us dene equilibrium and approximate equilibrium. A deviation plan for
player i is any measurable map i : Ai ! (Ai).5;6 Thus, obedience for player i is
the plan i dened pointwise by i(ai) = [ai].7 A prole of deviation plans or simply
deviation prole is any n-tuple  = (1;:::;n) of deviation plans for each player.
Thus, the obedient prole is  = (1;:::;n). A correlated strategy is any  2 (A).
Denition 2. A correlated strategy  is called a correlated equilibrium or simply an





ui(bi;a i)   ui(a)i(dbijai)(da)  0:
This denition may be interpreted as follows. A mediator selects an action prole a
according to the correlated strategy , and privately recommends each player to play
ai. Every player i contemplates a deviation plan i that amounts to recommendation-
contingent mixed strategies with the only restriction being that i be measurable.8
A correlated equilibrium is any  such that no deviation plan is ex ante protable.9
Denition 3. A weakly approximate correlated equilibrium or simply an approximate
equilibrium is any sequence of correlated strategies fmg  (A) such that for every







ui(bi;a i)   ui(a)i(dbijai)m(da)  0:
Intuitively, an approximate equilibrium is a sequence of correlated strategies such that
every player's deviation gains become arbitrarily small along the sequence, regardless
of the player's deviation plan. This denition is particularly weak because it is not
asking for uniform convergence across deviation plans or players.
5For a measurable space (X;X), (X;X) is the set of countably additive probability measures
on X with domain contained in X. If the -algebra X is understood, we abbreviate to (X).
6To dene measurability, endow (Ai) with the -algebra generated by the topology associated
with the total variation norm.
7The notation [ai] stands for Dirac measure.
8Otherwise, a player would not be able to evaluate deviation plans ex ante.
9Denition 6 is equivalent to that provided by Hart and Schmeidler (1989) for continuous utilities
on compact action spaces. The main dierence is that they allow  to be nitely additive when
utilities are not continuous, whereas here we restrict attention to the countably additive case. They
argue by example that nitely additive equilibrium may have undesirably unintuitive properties.
42.2 Consistency and Approximate Equilibrium
Next, we will dene consistency and near consistency of a deviation plan. The latter
will be equated to existence of approximate equilibrium. To this end, for any deviation









denote the sum of players' ex ante unilateral deviation gains from  when recommen-
dations are drawn according to . With a slight abuse of notation, write (a)()
instead of ([a])() for correlated strategies that happen to be pure action proles.10
Denition 4. A deviation prole  is consistent with equilibrium or simply consistent
if ()()  0 for some correlated strategy . It is nearly consistent if for every " > 0
there is a correlated strategy " such that (")() < ".
Intuitively, a deviation prole is consistent if it does not strictly dominate obedience
with respect to the sum of utilities. It is nearly consistent if it does not uniformly
strictly dominate obedience, i.e., there is no " > 0 such that the sum of deviation









Figure 1: Consistency (left) versus near consistency (right) of .
By convexity, we may have equivalently dened consistency and near-consistency
in terms of pure action proles rather than correlated strategies. Thus, it follows
immediately that a deviation prole is consistent if and only if (a)()  0 for some
action prole a, and it is nearly consistent if and only if for every " > 0 there exists
an action prole a" such that (a")() < ".
10The choice of notation ()() is explained later in Appendix A.
5Theorem 1. A game has an approximate correlated equilibrium if and only if every
deviation prole is nearly consistent.
The thrust of Theorem 1 is that dierent correlated strategies may be used to make
dierent deviation proles nearly consistent. Intuitively, if every deviation prole can
independently be made nearly unprotable then it is possible to jointly make every
deviation prole nearly unprotable. Conversely, to rule out approximate equilibria
it is enough to nd a deviation prole that fails to be nearly consistent. To illustrate,
consider the following classic example due to Sion and Wolfe (1957).
Example 2. Two players, Ai = [0;1] with the Borel -algebra and payos




 1 if a1 < a2 < z1 + 1=2





Figure 2: A zero-sum game with no value.
Let 1(f1gja1) = 1 if a1 < 1, 1(f0gj1) = 1=3, 1(f1gj1) = 2=3 and 2(f0gja2) =
2(f1=2gja2) = 1=2. It is easy to verify that this deviation prole is not nearly
consistent. Therefore, an approximate correlated equilibrium fails to exist.
By Theorem 1, equilibrium existence in games with nitely many actions as well as
those with compact metric action spaces and continuous payos follows easily. In-
deed, with nitely many actions near consistency clearly implies consistency, which
is dually equivalent to existence of correlated equilibrium (see, e.g., Myerson, 1997).
For continuous games with compact metric action spaces, an approximate equilibrium
has a (weak) convergent subsequence with a limiting correlated strategy that is a
correlated equilibrium by continuity of payos. Appealing to an argument by Hart
and Schmeidler (1989, page 24), without loss we may restrict attention to (weak)
continuous deviation proles. After such restriction it is easy to see that near consis-
tency again implies consistency by continuity and compactness.
62.3 Sequential Consistency and Equilibrium
The previous paragraph begs the question of whether consistency of every deviation
prole is sucient for equilibrium existence.11 Although it does lead to equilibrium in
both nite and compact-continuous games, we will show that consistency is generally
not enough for equilibrium to exist. To nd what is enough for equilibrium existence,
we rst dene consistency of a sequence of deviation proles.
Denition 5. A sequence of deviation proles fmg is consistent if
\
m2N
f 2 (A) : ()(m)  0g 6= ;:12
A sequence of deviation proles is consistent if all the deviation proles in the sequence
have a correlated strategy in common that make them simultaneously unprotable
with respect to the sum of utilities. Figure 3 (left) below provides an illustration
of such a consistent sequence. To help understand this denition, rstly notice that
restricting attention to constant sequences recovers consistency from Denition 4.
Indeed, clearly a constant sequence of deviation proles fmg with m =  for
all m is consistent if and only if  is consistent. Sequential consistency is strictly
stronger than consistency, as Figure 3 (right) suggests with an inconsistent sequence
fmg of deviation proles such that every deviation prole m is itself consistent.
Intuitively, sequential consistency requires consistency as well as a minimal amount




   (µ)( m)
  
  





 (µ)( m)  
Figure 3: Satisfaction (left) versus failure (right) of consistency for fmg.
11Clearly, consistency is necessary. Otherwise there exists a deviation prole such that the sum of
deviation gains is positive for every action prole. By linearity, it is still positive for every correlated
strategy, i.e., somebody always gains. Hence, correlated equilibrium fails to exist.
12For any deviation prole , f 2 (A) : ()()  0g is the set of correlated strategies whose
sum of deviation gains from  is not positive.
7Theorem 2. A game has a correlated equilibrium if and only if every sequence of
deviation proles has a consistent subsequence.
Call this condition, which characterizes equilibrium existence, sequential consistency.
Sequential consistency bridges the gap between consistency and equilibrium. On the
one hand, consistency ensures that no deviation plan can strictly dominate obedience,
even though dierent correlated strategies may be used to make dierent deviation
plans unprotable. On the other hand, equilibrium requires that the same correlated
strategy make unprotable every deviation plan simultaneously.
Rather than check if all deviation plans have a common correlated strategy that
makes them unprotable, it may be easier to check for sequential consistency, both
to conrm and deny equilibrium existence. Thus, to conclude that no equilibrium
exists, it is enough to nd a sequence of deviation proles such that every subsequence
is inconsistent. Although equilibrium discourages uncountably many deviation plans
simultaneously, Theorem 2 only requires focusing on them one sequence at a time.
We end this section with a corollary that oers a test of equilibrium existence that
may be easier to check than sequential consistency. Call a sequence fmg of deviation
proles purely consistent if
T
mfa 2 A : (a)(m)  0g 6= ;, i.e., there is a pure action
prole that makes it consistent. Figure 4 below illustrates the dierence between pure
consistency and consistency by sketching a consistent sequence of deviation proles




 (a)( m)  
Figure 4: A consistent but not purely consistent sequence fmg.
Since pure consistency implies consistency, it follows immediately from Theorem 2
that pure sequential consistency delivers equilibrium existence.
Corollary 1. A game has a correlated equilibrium if every sequence of deviation
proles has a purely consistent subsequence.
83 Discussion
In this section we shall comment on the signicance of Theorems 1 and 2, further
interpret consistency and sequential consistency, and relate them to the literature.
In nite games, the strategic content of equilibrium existence is arguably consistency:
equilibrium exists if and only if every deviation plan is consistent, although dierent
correlated strategies may be used to make dierent deviation plans consistent. Since
every deviation plan is consistent in a nite game, equilibrium exists. A similar logic
applies to compact-continuous games. In general games without topological structure,
the strategic content of equilibrium existence becomes sequential consistency. With
regard to approximate equilibrium, however, near consistency suces for existence:
approximate equilibrium exists as long as every deviation prole is nearly consistent,
where dierent correlated strategies may be used to make nearly consistent dierent
deviation proles. Strategically, this means that as long as every deviation plan can be
approximately discouraged individually then all can be discouraged simultaneously.
Theorems 1 and 2 interpret the dual inequalities to those describing equilibrium
existence. Since equilibrium is described linearly and the games under consideration
are relatively general, the conditions of these theorems cannot be relaxed. At the same
time, given the generality of the problem it is not surprising that the conditions are
general, dicult to check from a practical point of view. However, these conditions,
although generally impractical, do suggest a way to interpret equilibrium existence.13
Moreover, adding specicity to the model does add specicity, hence practical value,
to the characterizing conditions, sometimes even without loss of generality.
One way to add specicity to the model is to consider only simple deviation plans,
i.e., those with nite range, which is clearly without loss. Another specication that
does incur some loss is to endow action spaces with topologies. In this case, by
Lusin's Theorem (see, e.g., Folland, 1999) attention may be restricted to continuous
deviation plans, since they are dense in the space of all deviation plans. Such speci-
cations facilitate comparison with the literature. For instance, neither compactness
nor metrizability of action spaces is required for sequential consistency, in contrast
with the literature. As a result, this condition incorporates the relevant aspects|and
only the relevant aspects|of assumptions such as compactness for equilibrium.
13To illustrate, in one-player games sequential consistency is equivalent to the player's utility
function possessing a maximum, without requiring reference to continuity or compactness.
9Specically, compare sequential consistency with other conditions in the literature.
Firstly, consider Nikaido and Isoda (1955). They introduced the auxiliary function
(a;b) =
P
i ui(bi;a i) ui(a) and emphasized its use for studying Nash equilibrium,
establishing existence under certain continuity assumptions that were subsequently
relaxed by Baye et al. (1993). Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) required that (i)
P
i ui(a)
be upper semicontinuous, (ii) each ui(bi;a i) be \weakly" lower semicontinuous in bi,
and (iii) discontinuities lie along \diagonal" sets for mixed Nash equilibrium to exist.
Use of these \aggregators" has been criticized (e.g., Reny, 1999, footnotes 11 and 12)
for being cardinal in nature, and more \ordinal" generalizations of these conditions
have emerged (Simon, 1987; Reny, 1999).14 However, Theorems 1 and 2 show that  is
as ordinal as possible.15 In this paper,  follows from the Lagrangian associated with
nding correlated equilibrium, where deviation plans are (proportional to) multipliers
on incentive constraints. Hence, there is nothing ad hoc about restricting attention
to  when studying equilibrium existence.
Furthermore,  delivers and claries Reny's sucient condition, called better-reply
security, for existence of mixed Nash equilibrium (which in turn generalizes Simon's)
with a proof similar to that by Baye et al. (1993). Indeed, let (;) be the extension
of  to the (weak compact) space of mixed strategy proles. For every such prole
, let F = f : (;)  0g be the set of proles  that make  unprotable with re-
spect to . Clearly, equilibrium exists if and only if
T
 F 6= ;. If F is closed for every
 (which follows if (;) is lower semicontinuous in ) then we are done by compact-
ness and Nash's Theorem. To see this, for any nite subfamily f1;:::;mg, we must
have
T
k Fk 6= ;, since every nite game has an equilibrium point. Therefore, fFg
has the nite intersection property and by compactness equilibrium exists. In case





which leads to equilibrium since clearly fF g has the nite intersection property. To
see this, assume the contrary, i.e., there exists  2
T
 F  n
T
 F. Hence,  = 2 F for
some , i.e., (;) > 0, so  is not an equilibrium. By better-reply security, there
is a player i and a strategy b i such that ui(b i;b  i)   > ui for all b  i in some open
neighborhood of  i, where ui = limui(m) for some sequence fmg converging to .
14E.g., reciprocal upper semicontinuity (Simon, 1987) generalizes Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986)
requirement that the sum of utilities be upper semicontinuous (Reny, 1999, page 1034).
15When looking exclusively for pure strategy equilibria, seeking conditions that are ordinal in the
sense that they are invariant to monotone transformations of preferences can be justied. However,
when mixed or correlated strategies are considered, the meaningful family of preference-representing
utility functions is signicantly reduced to just ane transformations.
10But this implies that  = 2 F b , where b  = (b i; i), a contradiction. Otherwise, there
would exist some sequence fmg converging to  with (m;b )  0 for all m, i.e.,
ui(b i; im)  ui(m). But this contradicts better-reply security, since it implies that
ui(b i; im)   > ui(m) for all m large enough that jui(m)   uij <    ui.
How does sequential consistency compare with better-reply security? By Example 1
and Theorem 2, better-reply security implies sequential consistency but not otherwise.
For a version of better-reply security corresponding to correlated equilibrium, let





 F , where F  is the weak closure of F. This
yields the following generalization of better-reply security: if  2 (A) is not a
correlated equilibrium then there is a player i and a deviation plan i such that
ui(i; b )   > ui for all b  in some open neighborhood of , where ui = limui(m)
for some sequence fmg converging to . To see that (not even this version of)
better-reply security is unnecessary for sequential consistency consider the following
example of a one-person game. Let the player's action space be the interval A = [0;1]
with the usual topology, with his utility function equal to 1 if a 2 (1=3;2=3), and 0
otherwise. Clearly, better-reply security fails (since the set of equilibria is not closed)
yet sequential consistency holds, since equilibrium exists.
This discussion helps to clarify the content of Theorem 2. Since (A) (with the
topology of Appendix A) is Lindelo, it inherits the countable intersection property,
so equilibrium existence is implied by every sequence fmg satisfying
T
m Fm 6= ;.
In order to establish equilibrium existence, i.e.,
T
 F 6= ;, it is enough that every
sequence fmg to have a subsequence fmkg with
T
k Fmk 6= ;. (Necessity is obvious:
if some sequence has no consistent subsequence then clearly
T
 F = ;.)
As a nal comment on sequential consistency, note that it is not equivalent to nite
consistency, i.e., that every nite family of deviation plans is consistent with the same
correlated strategy. By Theorem 2, sequential consistency implies nite consistency.
For an example to show that the converse fails, consider a one-person game with
A = R and u(m;a) > 0 if and only if a  m. (Examples also exist with A compact.)
We end this section with a technical corollary of Theorem 2 and the Riesz Represen-
tation Theorem, characterizing regular equilibrium (see, e.g., Folland, 1999).
Corollary 2. If every Ai is locally compact Hausdor with the Borel -algebra then
sequential consistency also characterizes existence of regular correlated equilibrium.
114 Applications
In this section the main results of the paper, Theorems 1 and 2, are applied and
extended to three important settings. Firstly, we characterize existence of a value for
zero-sum games. Secondly, we characterize implementability allocations with linear
transfers. Finally, we characterize existence of equilibrium in games with incomplete
information on large type spaces, including the universal one.
4.1 Zero-Sum Games
In this subsection we explore equilibrium existence in two-person zero sum games. We
will adopt the following notation. Let X be the measurable space of actions for player
1 and Y the actions of player 2, with typical elements x and y. Let u : XY ! R be
player 1's contingent payment function from player 2, assumed bounded, measurable.
A deviation plan for player 1 is denoted by  and one for player 2 is denoted by .
An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is the following necessary and sucient condi-
tion for existence of correlated equilibrium.
Corollary 3. A two-person zero-sum game has a correlated equilibrium if and only if
every sequence f(m;m)g of deviation proles has a subsequence f(mk;mk)g with
\
k2N






u(w;y)mk(dwjx)d  0g 6= ;:
Given the particular structure of two-person zero-sum games, it is possible to char-
acterize Nash equilibrium with similar techniques, as the next result shows.
Theorem 3. A two-person zero-sum game has a Nash equilibrium if and only if every
sequence of mixed-strategy proles has a product-consistent subsequence, i.e., for each
sequence f(m;m)g  (X)  (Y ) there is a subsequence f(mk;mk)g with
\
k2N





u(x;y)[mk(dy)(dx)   mk(dx)(dy)]  0g 6= ;:
Call this property sequential product-consistency.
Existence of approximate correlated as well as Nash equilibria can also be character-
ized in the same spirit as Theorem 1 above|the details are available on request.
124.2 Mechanism Design
Let us rst dene a type space. For every player i, let Ti be a measurable space of





the product space of type proles, endowed with the product -algebra, and with
typical element t = (t1;:::;tn). Every player i's posterior beliefs conditional on his
type are collected in the measurable map pi : Ti ! (T i).16
Let X denote a measurable space of social choices, and endow every player i with a
bounded, measurable type-contingent utility function ui : X T ! R. An allocation
is any measurable map  : T ! (X).17 An allocation  is incentive compatible if






ui(xjt)[(dxjsi;t i)   (dxjt)]pi(t ijti)  0:
Clearly, a trivial allocation (with (t) = (s) for all t and s) is always incentive
compatible. Given an allocation  we will ask whether or not it is implementable
with linear transfers or simply implementable, i.e., there exists a bounded, measurable









We will characterize implementation as follows. A type-report outcome for player i is
any i 2 (Ti Ti), i.e., a probability measure over type-report pairs for player i. A
type-report outcome prole or simply outcome prole is any n-tuple  = (1;:::;n).




1S(t)   1S(si;t i)pi(dt ijti)di = 0:
A sequence of outcome proles or simply an outcome sequence is denoted by fmg.
An outcome sequence is asymptotically undetectable if limqim = 0 for every player i,
and asymptotically unprotable if lim
R
idim  0.
Theorem 4. An allocation is implementable if and only if every asymptotically un-
detectable outcome sequence is asymptotically unprotable.
16Measurability is dened by endowing (T i) with the Borel -algebra generated by the total
variation norm on (T i) as a subspace of M(T i).
17Footnote 16 applies with X instead of T i.
134.3 Communication Equilibrium
As usual, Ai denotes the set of actions available to player i, and A the product space
of action proles. With reference to the type space dened previously, endow every
player i with a bounded, measurable type-contingent utility function ui : AT ! R.
Assume that a player's type does not aect his available actions.18 A game with
incomplete information is a tuple (I;T;p;A;u) satisfying all of the above.
Next, we provide a notion of equilibrium for games with incomplete information.19
To this end, call a communication mechanism any measurable map  : T ! (A).20
Intuitively, a mediator asks players to report their types t and as a result makes rec-
ommendations according to the probability measure (t). We will draw a distinction
between disobedience, i.e., playing a dierent action from the mediator's recommenda-
tion, and dishonesty, i.e., misreporting one's type. A disobedience is any measurable
map i : Ai ! (Ai). Intuitively, i(ai) is played by i when ai is recommended. Let
Di be the set of all such disobediences.21 Let i = TiTiDi be the space of types,
reports, and disobediences, with typical element i = (ti;si;i) called an outcome for
player i. An overall outcome or simply an outcome is any n-tupe  = (1;:::;n).
Denition 6. A communication mechanism  is called a communiation equilibrium










ui(ajt)(dajt)pi(dt ijti)  0: ()
Denote the left-hand side of () by i()(i), and dene ()() :=
P
i i()(i).
With the same method of proof as for Theorem 2, we obtain the following exact
condition for existence of communication equilibrium on arbitrary type spaces.
Theorem 5. A game with incomplete information has a communication equilibrium




for every measurable subset S  T, every measurable map  : S ! (A) and all
except at most nitely many m implies that q(T)  0.
18This restriction is without loss by making unavailable actions extremely undesirable.
19See Forges (1993) for a discussion of equilibrium in games with incomplete information.
20Footnote 16 applies with A instead of T i.
21Using the norm kik = supai jij(Aijai), Di becomes a topological space. Endow Di with the
associated Borel -algebra to make it a measurable space.
145 Conclusion
This paper derived the alternative system of inequalities associated with existence of
correlated equilibrium as well as approximate equilibrium, provided an interpretation
of the alternative, brie
y discussed related literature, and suggested applications.
On the one hand, near consistency and sequential consistency provide a way of under-
standing equilibrium, more than necessarily providing a way to check for its existence.
On the other, this paper delineates the limits of what characterizations of equilibrium
can be obtained with use of duality. It would be interesting to nd ways of applying
sequential consistency as a useful tool for establishing equilibrium.
A Preliminaries
In this appendix we present Clark's (2006) extension of Farkas' Lemma as well as notation
that will be used to establish our main results.
Let X and Y be ordered, locally convex real vector spaces, with positive cones X+ and Y+
and topological dual spaces X and Y  such that X = X and Y  = Y . Let A : X ! Y
be a continuous linear operator with adjoint operator A : Y  ! X and x any b 2 Y .
Finally, for any set S let S denote its closure.
Lemma A.1 (Clark, 2006, page 479). For any b 2 Y , there exists x 2 X+ such that
A(x) = b if and only if A(y
0) 2 X
+   fA(y) : y(b) = 0g implies that y
0(b)  0.
Now for some notation. Let M(A) or simply M be the space of all nite (signed) measures
over A with respect to the -algebra A, and M(Ai) or simply Mi the same space of nite
measures over Ai. Write B(A) or just B for the space of all bounded, measurable, real-
valued functions on A, and B(Ai) or simply Bi for the corresponding space on Ai. We will
view M and B as a dual pair with respect to Lebesgue integration. That is, we will view
every f 2 B as a linear functional on M according to the operation f() =
R
fd, and
similarly every  2 M as a linear functional on B according to (f) =
R
fd. Endow M
with the weakest topology22 that makes the elements of B continuous linear functionals
as stated and similarly endow B with the weakest topology that makes every  2 M
continuous. Both topologies are locally convex, since they clearly separate points, and the
spaces are mutually dual (Schaefer, 1970, page 52).
22This is contained in the topology generated by the total variation norm, hence is rst countable,
so without loss it is described by sequences rather than nets.
15Let B(Ai;Mi) denote the space of bounded, measurable Mi-valued maps with the sup norm,
where Mi is endowed with the Borel -algebra generated by the topology induced by the




This is the space in which player i's deviation plans will live. It is easy to see that B(Ai;Mi)
is a Banach space under this norm.23 Write D =
Q
i B(Ai;Mi) for the vector space (with
the product topology) where feasible deviation proles will live. Let D be the topological
dual of D and D+ the positive cone of D.
Every game   induces an operator  : M ! D as follows, where D is endowed with the
weak topology. For any measure  2 M, () : D ! R is a continuous linear functional









For every  it is clear that () is a linear functional of . As for continuity, if m ! 
in D then maxi km
i k ! maxi kik. This convergence is in the total variation norm, which
is the same as convergence with respect to every bounded, measurable function, by the
Bounded Convergence Theorem. Hence, () is continuous, so () 2 D.
Notice also that  is linear and continuous as an operator M ! D. Linearity is obvious.
Continuity follows because if m !  then (m)() ! ()() for all , again by the
Bounded Convergence Theorem.24
The adjoint operator  : D ! B of  is dened as follows. For any  2 D, let () 2 B







Finally, since we also consider B as the dual space of M, we extend the domain of ()









Of course, the equation ()() = ()() follows by denition of the adjoint operator.
23Hence, its topology is rst-countable, so is described by convergent sequences rather than nets.
24Let b  =
P
m 2 mm. Now all the m's are absolutely continuous with respect to b  and so have
a Radon-Nikodym density in L1(b ), and now apply the Bounded Convergence Theorem.
16B Proofs
Theorem 1. The proof proceeds in three steps, and assumes the notation of Appendix A.
Firstly, a system of innite dimensional linear inequalities is posited in Step 1. Subsequently,
Clark's (2006) extension of Farkas' Lemma to innite dimensional spaces is applied in Step 2
to the system posited in Step 1. Finally, in Step 3 it is shown that the system of inequalities
in Step 1 fails to have a solution if and only if approximate equilibrium exists.
{ Step 1. Consider the following primal system of linear inequalities:
Find  2 R and  2 D+ such that ()()   for every  2 (A) and   1. (P)
We will transform Problem (P) into a canonical system of linear equations for which we
shall seek a non-negative solution. Dene T : R  D  B ! R  B pointwise by
T(;;) = (;()      1);
and write T for its adjoint operator. Clearly, T is a continuous linear operator since  is,
so its adjoint is, too. Clearly, problem (P) is equivalent to the following canonical version:
Find (;;) 2 (R  D  B)+ such that  = 1 and ()      1 = 0; (P)
where 1 2 B is the function identically equal to 1 and 0 2 B the zero function.
{ Step 2. Let F = fT(0;) :  2 Mg and J = (R  D  M)+   F. By Lemma A.1,
problem (P) has a solution if and only if for every (;0) such that  2 R and 0 2 M,
whenever T(;0) = (   0(A);(0); ) belongs to the cone J, it follows that   0,
where for any set S, S denotes its closure. Hence, (P) has a solution if and only if for every
(;0) there is a sequence f(m;
m;m)g  (R  D  M)+   F with limm =    0(A),
lim
m = (0), and limm =  0 only if   0.
Any element of J can be written as (++(A);+ ();++), where + 2 R+,  2 M,
+ 2 D
+ and + 2 M+. Therefore, problem (P) has a solution if and only if for every
 2 R and 0 2 M, if there is a sequence f(+
m;m;+
m ;+
m)g  R+  M  D+  M+ such
that lim+
m + m(A) =    0(A), lim+
m   (m) = (0) and lim+
m + m =  0 then
  0. Plugging the third limit into the rst one (together with continuity 1) yields
0 = lim+
m + m(A)    + 0(A) =
lim+
m + m(A)      +
m(A)   m(A) = lim+
m      +
m(A):
Clearly, this last limit equals zero if and only if liminf +
m(A)   . Also, plugging the
third limit into the second (with continuity and linearity of ) yields
0 = lim+
m   (m)   (0) =
lim+
m   (m) + (+
m + m) = lim+
m + (+
m):
17Clearly, this last limit equals zero if and only if limsup(+
m)  0. Finally, all this implies
that problem (P) has a solution if and only if
Given  2 R, f+
mg  M+, if liminf +
m(A)   , limsup(+
m)  0 then   0. (D)
{ Step 3. Finally, we equate (P) with failure of consistency and (D) with failure of existence
of approximate equilibrium. By Step 2, (D) holds if and only if no sequence fmg  M+
exists with liminf m(A) > 0 and limsup(m)()  0 for every deviation prole .
Clearly, this last condition is equivalent to the nonexistence of an approximate equilibrium.
Finally, we will show that failure of (P), i.e., that for every  2 D+ there exists  2 (A)
with ()() < 1, is equivalent to near consistency. Given any deviation prole  and
any " > 0, let " = =minf";1g. For suciency, given any deviation prole  and any
" > 0 it is clear that ()(") < ". For necessity, given  2 D+ and " > 0, for every
player i let i be the deviation plan dened pointwise by i(ai) = pi(ai) + (1   p)i(ai),
where p = minf";minfmaxifkikg;maxif1=kikggg 2 (0;1]. By hypothesis, the deviation
prole  = (1;:::;n) satises ()(") < " for some ". By linearity and the fact that
i is obedient, ()(") < " if and only if ()(") < "=p  1, as required. 
Theorem 2. The proof is \dual" to that of Theorem 1, and proceeds in three similar steps.
Firstly, the problem of equilibrium existence is formulated as a family of innite dimensional
linear inequalities in Step 1. Subsequently, Clark's (2006) extension of Farkas' Lemma to
innite dimensional spaces is applied in Step 2 to the system derived in Step 1. Finally,
the dual inequalities of Step 2 are related to sequential consistency in Step 3.
{ Step 1. With reference to Appendix A, consider the following primal problem:
Find  2 (A) such that ()()  0 for every  2 D with   0. (P)
Problem (P) is equivalent to nding  2 (A) such that ()  0 in D, as well as nding
 2 M with   0 such that (A)  1 and ()  0 in D.
Clearly, problem (P) characterizes correlated equilibrium, i.e., there exists a correlated
equilibrium if and only if (P) has a solution. This follows because for every player i, we
may set all other j's equal to always obeying and obtain ().
We will transform (P) into a canonical system of linear equations for which we shall seek a
non-negative solution. Let T : M  D ! R  D be dened pointwise by
T(;) = ( (A);() + )
for every  2 M and  2 D.
18Clearly, (P) is equivalent to the following version:
Find (;) 2 M  D with (;)  0 and T(;) = ( 1;0), (P)
where  1 2 R and 0 2 D. Here,  is a slack variable.
{ Step 2. Let F = fT(0;) :  2 Dg and J = (B D)+  F. By Lemma A.1, there exists
(;) to solve (P) if and only if given any  2 R and  2 D, T(;) 2 J implies that
  0, where for any set S, S denotes its closure. Hence, there exists correlated equilibrium
if and only if for every (;), there is a sequence f(m;m)g  J with limm = () 1
and limm =  (where 1 is the constant function identically equal to unity) only if   0.
Any (;) 2 J can be written as (+   ();+   ), where + 2 B+, + 2 D+, and
 2 D. Therefore, equilibrium exists if and only if for every  2 R and  2 D, if there is
a sequence f(+
m;m;+
m)g  B+  D  D+ such that lim()   1   +
m + (m) = 0
and lim+
m   m    = 0 then   0. Plugging the second limit into the rst (and using
continuity and linearity of  below) yields
lim()   1   +
m + (m) =
lim(+
m   m)   1   +
m + (m) =
lim(+
m)   1   +
m = 0:
Clearly, this last limit obtains if and only if liminf (+
m)()   for every  2 (A),
since +
m  0 for every m. Therefore, equilibrium exists if and only if:
Given  2 R and f+
mg  D+, liminf (+
m)()   for all  2 (A) implies   0. (D)
{ Step 3. Finally, we show that sequential consistency implies (D) and is implied by (P). Fix
any sequence f+
mg  D+. For every player i, let im be the deviation plan dened pointwise
by im(ai) = pim+














g 2 (0;1]. By
hypothesis, the sequence of deviation proles fm = (1m;:::;nm)g has a subsequence
fmkg with b  2
T
kf : ()(mk)  0g for some b  2 (A), hence liminf (b )(m)  0.
By linearity of  and the fact that i is obedient, liminf (+
m)(b )  0, so (D) holds.
Conversely, existence of correlated equilibrium clearly implies sequential consistency. 
Theorem 3. The proof follows similar steps to that of Theorem 2. Let U : M(X) ! M(Y )
be the map dened by U() =
R
X u(x;)(dx), where, as usual, M(X) = B(X). The
adjoint map U : M(Y ) ! M(X) is given by U() =
R
Y u(;y)(dy).
{ Step 1. Finding Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the following primal problem:
19exists if and only if there exists (;;v) 2 M(X)  M(Y )  R such that (;;v)  0 and
Find (;;v) 2 M(X)  M(Y )  R with (;;v)  0 and
(
U()  v1Y  U();
(1X) = (1Y ) = 1:
(P)
We will transform (P) into a canonical system of linear equations for which we shall seek a
non-negative solution. Let T : M(X)B(Y )M(Y )B(X)RR ! B(Y )B(X)RR
be dened pointwise by
T(;g;;f;c+;c ) = (U()+g (c+ c )1Y ; U()+f +(c+ c )1X; (1X); (1Y )):
Clearly, (P) is equivalent to the following standard problem
Find (;g;;f;c+;c )  0 such that T(;g;;f;c+;c ) = (0Y ;0X; 1; 1). (P)
{ Step 2. In order to appeal to Lemma A.1, dene F = fT(;;
;) : 
 +  = 0g and
J = (B(X)  M(Y )  B(Y )  M(X)  R  R)+   F. By Lemma A.1, there is a solution
to (P) if and only if given (;;
;) 2 M(Y )  M(X)  R  R, T(;;
;) 2 J implies
that 
 +   0. Hence, Nash equilibrium exists if and only if given (;;









m)g (where + means  0) such that
U()   
1X = limf+




 U()   1Y = limg+
m + U(m) + m1Y
 = lim+
m   m
(1X)   (1Y ) = lim
+
m + m(1Y )   m(1X)
(1Y )   (1X) = lim+
m + m(1X)   m(1Y )
and 
m+m = 0 for all m only if 
+  0. By continuity and linearity of U and U, simple
calculations show that this system of equations is equivalent to (i) lim +
m(1X) +





1X, and (iii) lim U(+
m)   g+
m   m1Y = 1Y .






 + , so 
 +   liminf U(+
m)()  
U(+
m)(). The rest of the proof follows Step 3 of Theorem 2. If every sequence of mixed-
strategy proles f(m;m)g  (X)  (Y ) has a subsequence f(mk;mk)g with the
property that
T
kf(;) 2 (X)  (Y ) : U(mk)()   U(mk)()  0g 6= ; then clearly
liminf U(+
m)()   U(+
m)()  0, so Nash equilibrium exists. Conversely, if there exists
Nash equilibrium then clearly sequential product consistency holds. 
Theorem 4. The proof follows the same line as the previous ones. 
20Theorem 5. The multi-step proof below follows that of Theorem 2 with minor adjustments.
We rst introduce some notation. Let C = f : T ! M(A) measurable and kk < 1g
endowed with the norm kk = supt jj(Ajt) be the vector space (indeed, Banach) where
communication mechanisms live. With reference to the notation of Denition 6, let us view
B(i) as M(i) (when endowed with the weakest topology that makes this work). Write
Bi = M(i), B
i = M(i), B =
Q
i M(i) and B =
Q
i M(i). Now, i can be viewed
as an operator C ! B, and  : C ! B.
{ Step 1. With reference to the above notation, consider the following primal problem:
Find  2 C so that (t) 2 (A) for all t and ()()  0 for all  2 B with   0. (P)
Clearly, problem (P) characterizes communication equilibrium, i.e., there exists a commu-
nication equilibrium if and only if (P) has a solution.
We will transform (P) into a canonical system of linear equations for which we shall seek a
non-negative solution. Let G : C  B ! B(T)  B be dened pointwise by
G(;) = ( (Aj);() + )
for every  2 C and  2 B. Clearly, (P) is equivalent to the following version:
Find (;) 2 C  B with (;)  0 and G(;) = ( 1;0), (P)
where 1 2 B(T) and 0 2 B. Here,  is a slack variable.
{ Step 2. Let F = fG(0;f) : f 2 Bg and J = (C B)+ F. By Lemma A.1, there exists
(;) to solve (P) if and only if given any q 2 M(T) and  2 B, G(q;) 2 J implies that
q(T)  0. Hence, there exists communication equilibrium if and only if for every (q;),
there is a sequence f(+
m;+
m;m)g  C 
+  B+  B with lim+
m   (m) = ()   q1
and lim+
m   m =  (where 1 2 B(A) is the function always equal to 1) only if q(T)  0.
Plugging the second limit into the rst (using continuity and linearity of  below) yields
lim(m)   +
m + ()   q1 =
lim(m)   +
m + (+
m   m)   q1 =
lim(+
m)   q1   +
m = 0:




T (Ajt)q(dt) for all  2 C with   0 implies q(T)  0. (D)
{ Step 3. It is easy to see that (D) holds if and only if given q 2 M(T) and any sequence
fm = (1m;:::;nm)g 
Q
i (i), if (m)() 
R
T (Ajt)q(dt) for every  2 C+ and
all except at most nitely many m then q(T)  0. Finally, this is clearly equivalent to
(m)()  q(S) for every measurable S  T and every measurable map  : S ! (A)
and all except at most nitely many m implying that q(T)  0. 
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